

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

10011

October 30, 1962

TO : The Secretary
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman *Roger Hilsman*
SUBJECT: Kuznetsov's Verification Proposals Versus
Previous Soviet Disarmament Control Provisions

Kuznetsov's proposal that the dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba should be verified by a UN team at the former sites of the missiles after the Soviets have reported that dismantling has been accomplished is at variance with Moscow's Disarmament Treaty of September 22, 1962.

Article 5 of that treaty states that implementation of the destruction of all launch pads, silos and rockets shall be verified. Likewise, Article 9, which deals with dismantling of foreign military bases, stipulates that the implementation of the dismantling of such bases should be verified.

Proposed US Yardsticks for Verification

It seems to me that implementation of the dismantlement of the missile sites could only be verified by (1) observation of the missile sites, (2) observation, not necessarily at the site itself but from low flying aircraft, of the act of dismantling or demolition, (3) observation of the transport of the dismantled equipment to embarkation points, (4) observation of the loading of the dismantled equipment onto ships, and (5) observation of the fact that the ships have departed Cuba and do not return. (Ideally, one should also verify the off-loading of the equipment in the USSR.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/IR

REVIEWED BY *Moskowitz* DATE *12/12/62*

CONFIDENTIAL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

039

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I note that Kuznetsov has said nothing about offensive aircraft. Article 6 of the Soviet treaty provides the relevant provision covering these.

I am of course not suggesting that we base ourselves entirely on the Soviet Treaty which has its own ambiguities and shortcomings (and whose acceptance by US would create a very undesirable precedent for the future); I do suggest that Kuznetsov thus far has fallen short of even the inadequate provisions offered by the USSR in the disarmament context, and that both on that ground and to satisfy our own security requirements we have ample reason to press him to be more forthcoming.

CONFIDENTIAL

040

CONFIDENTIAL